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UTAH CODE ANN.

(1987)

HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE

78-14-4

(30) "Health care" means any act, or treatment performed or furnished,
or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health care
provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care,
treatment or confinement.
(31) "Future damages" includes damages for future medical treatment,
care or custody, loss of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future
pain and suffering of the judgment creditor.
History: L. 1976, ch. 23, § 3; L. 1985, ch.
242, § 56.
Meaning of "this act". — The phrase "this
act", referred to in the introductory language,
means Laws 1976, Chapter 23, which enacted
this chapter.
Compiler's Notes. — Section 58-13-17, re-

ferred to in Subsection (6), was repealed by
Laws 1953, ch. 94, § 1. A definition of "certified nurse midwife" now appears in § 58-44-4.
Section 58-8-9, referred to in Subsection (8),
was repealed by Laws 1979, ch. 13, § 1. A definition of "practice of dental hygiene" now appears in § 58-7-1.1.

78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions — Application.
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought
unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the
injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the
alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except that:
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider
is that a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body,
the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully left
in the patient's body, whichever first occurs; and
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented
from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because
that health care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal
the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced
within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use
of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs.
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of
minority or other legal disability under § 78-12-36 or any other provision of
the law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associations and corporations and to all health care providers and to all malpractice
actions against health care providers based upon alleged personal injuries
which occurred prior to the effective date of this act; provided, however, that
any action which under former law could have been commenced after the
effective date of this act may be commenced only within the unelapsed portion
of time allowed under former law; but any action which under former law
could have been commenced more than four years after the effective date of
this act may be commenced only within four years after the effective date of
this act.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GARY GRIFFITHS, as guardian ad
litem for KEVIN G. MEEHAN, and
PATRICK B. MEEHAN; and MARIAN
J, MEEHAN,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
J. DALLAS VanWAGONER,

Civil No, 89-0900111-CV
Judge Pat B. Brian

Defendant.

This action came on regularly for hearing on September 28,
1990, before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Pat B.
Brian, presiding.

The plaintiffs appeared by and through their

counsel, Roger Christensen and Richard Evans of Christensen,
Jensen & Powell, and defendant appeared by and through his
counsel, Elizabeth King of Snow, Christensen & Martineau.
Defendant moved for dismissal of plaintiffs1 Complaint for
failure to comply with the relevant statute of limitations
encoded in Section 78-14-4, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended), and

plaintiffs moved to strike defendant's statute of limitations
defenses.
After hearing oral argument and reviewing the memoranda on
file, the Court now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On July 27, 1981, Mrs. Marian J. Meehan delivered

premature twins.
2.

in their Complaint, plaintiffs allege treatment by Dr.

VanWagoner resulted in brain damage to the twins following
premature labor and delivery.
3.

The Notice of Intent to Commence a Medical Malpractice

Action was dated August, 1988.
4.

Since 1976, Utah has adopted a two-year discovery or

four-year limitations period for medical malpractice actions.
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be
brought unless it is commenced within two years after
plaintiff or patient discovers or through the use of
reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury,
whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after
the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect or
occurrence.
Section 78-14-4(1), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1976).
5.

In 1979, the Utah Legislature amended this statute of

limitations as follows:
The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons,
regardless of minority or other legal disability . . . . any
action which under former law could have been commenced more
than four years after the effective date of this act may be
commenced only within four years after the effective date of
this act.
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Section 78-14-4(2), Utah Code Ann, (Supp. 1979).
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court draws the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This action is a medical malpractice action against a

health care provider, which is governed by the Utah Health Care
Malpractice Act, Section 78-14-4(1), et seq., Utah Code Ann.
(1953 as amended).
2.

The statute of limitations encoded in Section 78-14-

4(1) applies regardless of minority or any other legal disability
pursuant to Section 78-14-4(2),
3.

Plaintiffs were required as a matter of law to initiate

their medical malpractice claim within four years after the date
of the alleged neglect.
4.

Plaintiffs' Complaint, initiated seven years after the

medical care here at issue, is absolutely time-barred by the
applicable statute of limitations,
5.

This Court must bow to the presumption of the validity

of the Legislature's action in amending the applicable statute of
limitations so as to specifically apply the statute regardless of
disability or minority.

This Court does not presume to second-

guess the Legislature and will, therefore, not assess

the

strength or weaknesses of plaintiffs1 constitutional claims.

-3-

ORDER
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, as well as on the memoranda submitted by the parties, the
Court denies the plaintiffs' Motion to Strike defendant's statute
of limitations defenses and grants the defendant's Motion to
Dismiss and orders that plaintiffs' Complaint be, and the same is
hereby, dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, with each party to bear its own costs.
DATED this Q-^1

day of October, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

Pat B. Brian
District Court Judge

23\EKB\ 1022**. 57u\f i ndi ngs. «tc
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
)
)

ss.

MARIE B. VAN WENSVEEN, being duly sworn, says that she is
employed in the law office of Snow, Christensen & Martineau,
attorneys for defendant J. Dallas VanWagoner, M.D. herein; that
she served the attached Notice of Entry of Order of Dismissal
With Prejudice (Case No. 890900111CV, Salt Lake County) upon the
parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof
in an envelope addressed to:
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Roger P. Christensen, Esq.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
175 South West Temple, Suite 510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid,
on the jsfck

day of December, 1990.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this (j-trf
December, 1990.

day of

/~

Residing in the state of Utah
My Commission-Ex©iires;

IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

STEVEN H. BLUM, as Guardian ad
litem of SCOTT NILES, a minor
and mental incompetent,
Plaintiff,
Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 20288

RODNEY A. STONE, M.D., WESTERN
GYNECOLOGICAL AND OBSTETRICAL
CLINIC, and COTTONWOOD
HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER,
jointly and severally,
Defendants,
Respondents.
* * * * * * * *

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
* * * * * * *

On Appeal From the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah
The Honorable Phillip R. Fishier Presiding

BRINTON BURBIDGE
KURTON, MCCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorney for Defendant Hospital
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ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS
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GORDON L. ROBERTS (2770)
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created
statute*

and

the purposes

sought

to be

accomplished

by

the

That is, the classification (in this case abrogation

of the tolling provisions S 78-12-36(1) for minor victims of
medical

malpractice

only)

must

be

directly

and

rationally

related to the accomplishment of the legislative purpose.

The

main objectives of Utah's Medical Malpractice Act as set forth
in S 78-14-2 were to decrease or stabilize the cost of medical
malpractice insurance and tlereby decrease or stabilize health
care

costs

availability

generally;
of

as

well

as

to

Utah

insurance

to

ensure

the

physicians,

continued

and

quality

health care to Utah citizens*
Appellant

has attempted

to determine

the basis for

Utah's medical malpractice legislation in 1976 and 1979 without
success.

So far as we can tell, there is none.

legislative

history

there

is

for

the

Act

What little
consists

of

self-serving declarations from malpractice insurers that there
was a 'problem,"

No explanation for the cause of the problem

was given the legislators, and the record
examples from Utah.

is devoid

of any

With regard to the so-called 'long-tail"

problem with claims of minors, one New York case is cited.
[Portions of the Legislative history from 1976 are attached in
the addendum at Tab 8.]
The only evidence that is available indicates that the
•long-tail" problem with

claims of minors did and does not

exist

in

Utah;

and

that

the

cost

of

malpractice

insurance

premiums plays an infinitesimal role in the cost of health care.
Reliable information
on

behalf

of

minors

in

about medical malpractice

Utah

is

impossible

to

claims

come

by.

Malpractice carriers either do not keep or will not divulge the
information.
by

the

The only reliable information comes from a study

National

Association

of

Insurance

Commissioners

[hereinafter, "NAIC Report,• See, Tab 10].

That study surveyed

all

a

closed

medical

malpractice

claims

on

nationwide

basis

during the period 1975 through 1978.

That, of course, is the

period

malpractice

during

which

the alleged

Utah

crisis

motivated the subject legislation was at its height.
was

funded

information
case

by

voluminous

included came from insurance carriers1

malpractice

As

authoritative

insurance

such,

the

industry

report

is

and

The study

the

files.

the

that

considered

the

to date on recent malpractice claims

most

experience

in the country.
During the three and one-half year period between 1975
and 1978, a total of 237

"claims"

(not necessarily

lawsuits)

were made against Utah physicians, only 84 of which resulted in
any payment to plaintiffs.

Of those, only four awards were in

excess

the

of

$1,813,452;

$100,000,
an

average

$7,652 per claim made.

and
of

total

$21,589

per

of

all

paid

payments

claim,

[NAIC Report at pg. 121].
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and

was
only

During this

X) up

exist

lh Utah; and

that

li;eare5

the

cost

p^7 ^

of

/9

malpractice /insurance

premiums plays an infinitesimal role in the cost of/nealth care.
Reliable information about medical malp/actice claims
on

behalf

of\ minors

in

Utah

is

impossible

to

come

by.

Malpractice carreers either do not keep or wiJj. not divulge the
information.
by

the

The \nly reliable informatiopr comes from a study

National

Association

of

Insurance

Commissioners

[hereinafter, "NAIC Rej^rt," Seef Tab 1/0]. That study surveyed
all closed medical malpXactice claims on a nationwide basis
during the period 1975 thr\ugh 197/.

That, of course, is the

period during which the allVfed/Utah malpractice crisis that
motivated the subject legislation was at its height.
was

funded

by

the

insurance \ndustry

files.

As

such, /the

the

voluminous

insurance carriers1 malpractice

information included came from
case

and

The study

report\is

considered

the

most

authoritative to date 6n recent malpractice claims experience
in the country.
During the/three and one-half year\r>eriod between 1975
and 1978, a total of 237 "claims" (not necessarily lawsuits)
were made against Utah physicians, only 84 of w&Lch resulted in
any payment t/o Dlaintiffs.

Of those, onlv four a\ards were in

excess

the

of/$100,000,

and

total

$1,813,4S2; an average of $21,589 per
$7,652/per claim made.

of

all

paid

payments

claim, V n d

was
only

[NAIC Report at pg. 121]. Durirvg this

same period of alleged

"crisis," Aetna, then the major Utah

carrier of malpractice insurance, collected over $15,000,000 in
insurance premiums.
For minors, the figures for 1975-1978 are as follows:
total claims - 17

(7.25%),

total paid

claims

- 9 (10.7%);

average number of months from incident until report for paid
claims - twelve months,

[NAIC Report at pg. 115].

Where is the long-tail problem that motivated the Utah
Malpractice Act so that "liability insurance premiums can be
reasonably

and

accurately

calculated?"

[§ 78-14-2].

The

long-tail problem, as any reasonable person would expect, was
and is non-existent.

The parents or guardians of an injured

infant will naturally assert its cause of action as soon as
possible in most instances.

It is only in the very rare case

where the child's legal injury is not discoverable for four
years, or where the parents are ignorant or unmotivated that
infants

need

S 78-12-36(1).

the protection

of

a

tolling

statute

such

as

Those rare instances will cause no harm to

insurance companies who routinely grossly

3

That appears to be exactly the type of situation that
prevailed in this case, as evidenced from the following excerpt
from Dave Niles deposition:
Q: Did you share your wife's suspicion in
1969 that the care she had received from
Dr. Stone
during
delivery
was
not
appropriate?

3(Continued)
/

A:
A recall her visiting the physrician she
talkeck about in OB and her comiog home and
telling, me about the doctor's Comment and
her
noticing
that
it
said/ a
normal
delivery^ I think that we thought or talked
amongst ourselves of a sense
of,
if this is
normal, rJm not sure why ariyone wants to
continue t\ have babies. Thart was about the
extent of rt. We did not,/l think, discuss
that' s abnorWl and we snoi/ld seek some kind
of leqal coi^nsel . Mainly' because at that
time in our \ lives f it/ was somethin g we
really di dn't yant to Qfit into and it 3ust
wasn't h igh on our yilSt Of priorities.
[Depo. of Dave \Niles/ at pg. 16 (empnasis
added)].
And from the deposition of

m n Niles:

Q: Having had (knowledge of Scott's injury)
for more than ten ye^ars and having had the
burden of carinc/ for \scott for all of those
ten years, can/you teYl me why it was that
it was 1980 thaft you fi\st saw a lawyer?
A:
Yes, fi/st its a flatter of survival,
coping day/ by day, an«3 that's not the
prevalent jching on your W n d at the time.
Its learnimg to cope with fthe situations and
the trauina you're going thorough. And that
went on /tor quite a long time, and also the
fact th4t not being financially able to do
anything anyway, to even cal\ a lawyer or
anyth/ng, and not knowing what\ resources to
use./ We were young.
We were\25.
It was
just: a matter of trying to W r v i v e for
awhile, and we knew absolutely\ nobody in
innesota] and we were all by ourselves and
st trying to survive.
[Depo. \of Elynn
iles at 59.]
(The Wiles
delive/y.)

moved

to

Minneapolis

nine

day*

after

overestimate
income.

future

losses

in

order

to

offset

investment

Medical Care Cost

Containment

4
In a document

Proposals, prepared

by

entitled
the

Utah

State Medical Association

in

March of 1984, (attached in the addendum at Tab 11), the true
causes of increased

health

care for the period

1974

thought

1982 were presented by physicians themselves as follows:
(a)

General inflation -

59%

(b)

Medical care inflation including
technology (over and above general
inflation>

11%

(c)

An increasing and aging population

8%

(d)

Modern medical care financing and the
effect of government health programs

20%

TOTAL Before Effect of Increased Cost of
Malpractice Premiums

98%

What effect, then, has the increased frequency of tort
claims

and

average

awards

had

on

health

care

costs?

The

figures and analysis presented by the Utah State Medical
^By year-end 1983, the Utah Medical Insurance Association
("UMIA"), Utah's primary malpractice carrier, had paid out a
total of $2,7 million on claims in its five-year history.
During the same period it had collected over $15 million in
premiums, and earned $4.3 million in investment income. Yet,
for 1983 alone, UMIA claimed $3.3 million in unpaid losses
(more than its five-year total), to bring its total unpaid
losses as of the year-end 1983 to over $8.5 million. (Sources:
UMIA financial statement for 1983, and Best's Insurance Reports
for property-casualty companies, 1983 and 1984.)
Note that
these disproportionate projections all took place during a
period when minors' causes of action were statutorily limited
to a maximum of four years.
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Association demonstrates that it is negligible, most probably
less than 1%, and it is not difficult to realize why this is
so.

Malpractice awards and defense costs are paid by insurance

companies.
system,

Insurance companies are not part of the health care

they

successful
insurance

are

independently

operated

businesses which, through
and

collection

and

immensely

issuance of malpractice

of premiums, play

insignificant role in health care costs.

an

indirect and

The occasionaly large

verdicts and settlements that receive a great deal of publicity
and attention are not health care costs.
health care consumers involved

The only cost to

in a million

dollar

judgment

against a physician is the premium that physician pays annually
for malpractice insurance.
The fact that an alleged medical malpractice "crisis*
never existed, or abated, was the basis for several states*1
conclusions that their malpractice acts were unconstitutional.
In Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125
Dakota

Supreme

Court

struck

down

(N.D. 1978), the North
that

state's

entire

malpractice act, in part, on the basis of a finding that no
crisis existed.

The court stated:

The evidence in the case before us, however,
indicates that either the legislature was
misinformed
or
suosequent
events
have
changed the situation substantially.
[Id.
at 136].
The court in Arneson utilized the intermediate test for equal
protection analysis.

In Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 P.2d 87 (R.I.

-24-

1893)/

the

standard

court
in

utilized

finding

unconstitutional.

the

lower-tier

its

entire

rational-basis

malpractice

act

The court stated:

Because no obvious crisis exists to support
the challenged legislation, we shall . . .
decline to speculate about unexpressed or
unobvious permissible state interests.
Absent a crisis to justify the enactment of
such
legislation, we can ascertain no
satisfactory reason for the separate and
unequal treatment that it imposes on medical
malpractice
litigants.
The
statute
constitutes
special
class
legislation
enacted solely - for the benefit of specially
defined
defendant
health-care
providers.
[Id. at 93].
See also, Jones v. State Board of Medicine,

(District Court

findings

court

on

remand

discussed

supra).

This

has

also

stated unequivocally that the original factual predicate for a
statute

and

prompted

the

analysis.

any

subsequent

legislation

change

are

from

relevant

the
to

situation which
equal

protection

See, discussion of Malan v. Lewis, infra.

The evidence available clearly demonstrates that there
is no factual predicate for the discriminatory
created by S 78-14-4, and

that abrogation

classification

of minors1

rights

guaranteed by S 78-12-36(1) will not substantially further the
objectives of the malpractice act.
be

found

unconstitutional

as

a

Therefore, S 78-14-4 should
denial

insofar as the statute applies to minors.

of

equal

protection

Respectfully

submitted this

2H

w

day of

/Mj4itCH

,

1985.

GORDJpN L. ROBERTS
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered, 4 true
and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
to the following on this

91ih day of

fijfrch

BRINTON BURBIDGE
KURTON, MCCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorney for Defendant Hospital
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
EDWARD R. STEIN
ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS
BRUCE H. JENSEN
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorney for Defendants Stone
and Western Gynecological
and Obstetrical Clinic
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 3000
EDWARD R. STEIN
O'BRIEN, MORAN & STEIN
320 North Main street
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104
Attorneys for Appellant
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